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INTRODUCTION
Anyone who has ever worked in a retail setting cringes when the
owner puts the Assistant Manager in charge of the store. The Assistant
Manager is the subordinate to whom the owner gives vague instructions,
and then fails to grant sufficient decision-making authority to carry out
those instructions. The Assistant Manager’s insecurity quickly shows;
this person is fairly sure of the mandate but not necessarily certain how
to go about achieving it. This person, though well meaning, is essentially
powerless and ineffective. Anyone who must depend on this person in
any meaningful way is in for an uphill struggle for satisfaction.
Congress, acting as the “owner” of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”),
has put the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and the Army
Corps of Engineers (“the Corps”) in charge of the store. In the 1970s,
Congress supplemented the Rivers and Harbors Act (“RHA”) with
comprehensive environmental legislation, but delegated to the EPA a
scientifically impossible task.1 Congress proclaimed a sweeping mandate
to protect the integrity of the nation’s waterways from the ever-growing
national water pollution problem, and then empowered the EPA to act
only within the actual geographical limits of those waterways.2 The EPA
has struggled since then to execute Congress’s broad mandate in the
wake of mixed political messages and jurisdictional restraints.
Furthermore, the EPA, at once encouraged and hobbled, has inevitably
stumbled into the many pitfalls of state sovereignty, constitutional
problems, and constraints arising from the Administrative Procedure
Act.3 Indeed, regulated individuals who rely on the EPA to administer
the CWA consistently are currently forced to follow a moving target.
This comment explores the Environmental Protection Agency’s
administration of the Clean Water Act, detailing its partnership with the
Army Corps of Engineers and its struggle to recognize and enforce the
grey areas of Congress’s intent.4 It also explores the tension flowing
from the long struggle of the EPA to define the contours of Clean Water
Act jurisdiction in the shadow of their statutory limitations and
1
The Clean Water Act, enacted in 1972 and codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-63, 1265,
1281-92, 1311-26, 1328, 1341-45, 1361-76, took over the pollution control aspects of the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401,
403-04, 406-409, 411-416, 418, 502, 687, but retained its geographical jurisdictional
limitations.
2
See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006) (“The objective of this chapter is to restore and
maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”), 33
U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006) (“The Secretary may issue permits . . . for the discharge of
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters . . . .”).
3
See infra Parts II.A-C.
4
See discussion infra Part I.
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conflicting political messages from Congress, and the struggle of the
federal courts to do the same with no clear guidance from the Supreme
Court.5 Finally, this comment focuses on the Clean Water Act’s
misplaced geographical link to navigable water servitude and suggests an
alternate basis for federal water pollution jurisdiction.6 This comment
proposes that the CWA’s geographical jurisdictional link to navigable
waters is unnecessary under the Commerce Clause and unfaithful to the
stated objective of the Act. Furthermore, this comment recommends that
Congress strengthen the CWA by dispensing with the unnecessary
geographical jurisdictional link and allowing the EPA to regulate
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce regardless of
where those activities occur.
Part I provides a legislative history of the Clean Water Act,
beginning with the origins of federal navigation servitude and the River
and Harbors Act of 1899. The RHA was an early attempt by Congress to
regulate the nation’s rivers and harbors and later to protect their integrity
generally from the effects of pollution, and later formed the basis for the
CWA.7 Part I then traces the legislative history through to the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, pointing out the moment when
Congress could have made federal water pollution control effective and
long-lasting. Part I then moves on through the Corps’ regulatory
language under the CWA, a federal court’s order to amend the language,
and then to the congressional struggle to amend the Clean Water Act
itself in 1977. Nine years later, the EPA and the Corps finally reconciled
conflicting regulatory language defining their jurisdiction under the
CWA.8 Remarkably, Congress never took the logical step needed to
resolve confusion over the CWA’s jurisdiction, namely, to remove the
CWA’s geographical limitation and allow the EPA to regulate based on
their scientific expertise.9
Part II examines the Supreme Court’s efforts over time to define
CWA jurisdiction, the Corps’ regulatory responses to those decisions,
and the resulting confusion in the federal courts. The most recent
Supreme Court decision to address the issue of CWA jurisdiction, United
States v. Rapanos,10 has done little if anything to dispel confusion in the
federal courts or with the administrators of the CWA. Indeed, the 4-1-4
split decision has created additional confusion in the lower courts as they
5
6
7
8
9
10

See discussion infra Part II.
See discussion infra Part III.
See discussion infra Part II.
See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Parts III-IV.
126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
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struggle to fathom its meaning.11 Part II illustrates the abject
ineffectiveness of attempts to normalize CWA jurisdiction judicially or
through Corps regulation, which points strongly to Congressional
amendment of the CWA as the only remaining and meaningful solution.
Part III offers alternate and possibly equally valid ways to discern
the ultimate holding of the Rapanos 4-1-4 split decision. This Part
examines whether Marks v. United States12 might provide assistance and
details how interpretations of the Rapanos decision in the lower courts
have already diverged.13 This Part also outlines three approaches to
handling the jurisdiction issue going forward, namely continuing on a
case-by-case basis, promulgating new agency regulations, and amending
the CWA itself. The first two approaches have already proven ineffective
and troublesome.14 The third approach has the potential to solve the
jurisdictional issue and significantly strengthen the legislation.15
Finally, this Part offers a solution to the judicial and agency
confusion caused by the CWA’s “navigable waters” jurisdictional limit.
This Part suggests that Congress could do away with the limit entirely
and the CWA would still pass constitutional muster, as does the
Endangered Species Act, for example, which contains no such
jurisdictional limit.16 Congress could instead root its authority solely in
its power to regulate interstate commerce, without any geographical
jurisdictional limit to “waters of the United States.”17 In this way,
Congress could settle the jurisdiction question, remain faithful to the
stated purpose of the Clean Water Act, and create truly effective federal
water pollution control legislation.
I. FEDERAL CLEAN WATER LEGISLATION
Congress does not possess unlimited power to act under the United
States Constitution. The Constitution instead delegates to Congress “All
legislative Powers herein granted.”18 That is, the Constitution sets forth
limited and enumerated Congressional powers. Among these is the
power to declare war, to collect taxes, and to “regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

See discussion infra Part II.F.
430 U.S. 188 (1977).
See discussion infra Part III.A.
See discussion infra Part III.B.1-2.
See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
See discussion infra Part III.C.
See discussion infra Part IV.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
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Tribes.”19 It is under the last authority that Congress has enacted all
federal pollution control legislation.
A. Federal Navigation Servitude: Early Supreme Court Decisions
In an early decision, the Supreme Court held that Congressional
Commerce Clause power includes the authority to control the navigable
waters of the United States.20 The Gibbons Court stated that “[a]ll
America understands, and has uniformly understood, the word
‘commerce,’ to comprehend navigation. It was so understood, and must
have been so understood, when the constitution was framed.”21
Therefore, the Gibbons Court concluded, Congress had power to control
channels of interstate commerce such as “bays, inlets, rivers, harbours,
and ports” of the United States.22
In another important early decision, the Supreme Court held that
the term “navigable” in the United States was not linked to tides as it is
in other countries. The Daniel Ball Court noted in 1871 that “[h]ere the
ebb and flow of the tide do not constitute the usual test, as in England, or
any test at all of the navigability of waters.”23 The Daniel Ball Court
noted that in the United States, many waters are commercially navigable
in fact but that are not tidal.24 The Daniel Ball Court held that “navigable
waters” therefore included non-tidal waters “used, or are susceptible of
being used, in their ordinary condition, as highways for commerce.”25
The Daniel Ball Court further held that such waters are subject to
Congressional control “when they form . . . by themselves, or by uniting
with other waters, a containued [sic] highway over which commerce is or
may be carried on with other States or foreign countries.”26 This decision
affirmed Congress’s power to regulate bodies of water such as the Great
Lakes and intrastate rivers as instruments of commerce.
19

Id. § 8, cl. 3.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 197 (1824) (“The power of Congress . . .
comprehends navigation, within the limits of every State in the Union; so far as that
navigation may be, in any manner, connected with ‘commerce with foreign nations, or
among the several States, or with the Indian tribes.’”).
21
Id. at 190.
22
Id. at 208.
23
The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557, 563 (1871).
24
Id. (“Some of our rivers are as navigable for many hundreds of miles above as they
are below the limits of tide water, and some of them are navigable for great distances by
large vessels, which are not even affected by the tide at any point during their entire
length.”); see also Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. 443, 457 (1852) (“It is evident that
a definition that would at this day limit public rivers in this country to tide-water rivers is
utterly inadmissible. We have thousands of miles of public navigable water, including
lakes and rivers where there is no tide.”).
25
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. at 563.
26
Id.
20
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In a later opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed and expanded the
Daniel Ball Court’s definition of “navigable waters” as it applied to
federal regulatory jurisdiction.27 The Appalachian Electric Court held
that waters that are now or ever have been susceptible for use in
transporting goods, either in their natural state or with reasonable
improvements, are “navigable waters” of the United States.28 The
Appalachian Electric Court thus expanded Congress’s regulatory power
over waters that were, either in their natural state or with reasonable
improvements, susceptible to navigation or had been susceptible to
navigation in the past.
B. Pre-Clean Water Act Jurisdiction: The River and Harbors Act
Building on the Gibbons and Daniel Ball decisions, Congress
enacted the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 (“RHA”).29
The RHA gave the United States Army Corps of Engineers authority to
protect, enhance, and develop navigable waters.30 It also gave the
Secretary of the Army regulatory authority, through the Corps, to grant
or deny permission to “excavate or fill or in any manner to alter or
modify the course, location, condition, or capacity of . . . any navigable
water of the United States.”31 Finally, the RHA gave the Secretary of the
Army authority to grant or deny, through the Corps, permission “to
throw, discharge, or deposit . . . any refuse matter of any kind . . . into
any navigable water of the United States, or into any tributary” where
“the same shall . . . be washed into such navigable water.”32 The RHA
provided similar regulation of dumping from the shore to prevent
navigation from being “impeded or obstructed.”33 This provision also
contained an exception for “the improvement of navigable waters or
construction of public works.”34 Thus, the main concern of the RHA was
the protection of the physical navigability of the nation’s waterways.
For nearly seventy years, the Corps generally exercised its
regulatory authority to protect navigable waters that were actually being
27

United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
Id. at 407-08 (“A waterway, otherwise suitable for navigation, is not barred from
that classification merely because artificial aids must make the highway suitable for use
before commercial navigation may be undertaken. . . . When once found to be navigable,
a waterway remains so.”).
29
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403-04, 406-09, 411-16, 418, 502, 687 (2006)).
30
33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403, 407 (2006).
31
33 U.S.C. § 403.
32
33 U.S.C. § 407.
33
Id.
34
Id.
28
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used as channels to facilitate commerce.35 Environmental problems were
ordinarily left to the states to control.36 However, “the states [generally]
failed to enact or implement effective laws to control or prevent water
pollution.” 37 By the late 1960s, the Corps recognized that “water
pollution and wholesale destruction of aquatic habitat, fisheries, and
wetland areas that lie within the reach of the traditional navigable waters
of the United States” were becoming increasingly serious problems.38
In 1968, the Corps responded to the problem of water pollution by
promulgating a new set of regulations.39 Rather than limiting their scope
solely to the protection of the physical navigability of the nation’s
waterways, the regulations adopted general policies and specific
procedures for the Corps to consider matters of public interest “in
processing permit applications for dredging, filling, excavation, and
other related work in navigable waters of the United States.”40 Relevant
factors included “the effect of the proposed work on navigation, fish and
wildlife, conservation, pollution, aesthetics, ecology, and the general
public interest.”41 The regulations also provided for mandatory public
notice to “all parties deemed likely to be interested” of permit
applications for any work aside from “dredging of vessel berths and
approach channels which cannot affect adversely any interests.”42 The
District Engineer or other officer would preside over discretionary public
hearings for permit applications “whenever there appear[ed] to be
sufficient public interest.”43
The Corps construed its jurisdiction under the RHA so broadly
during this time that legislative action seemed virtually inevitable.44
Congress could have either expressly affirmed or curtailed the Corps’
jurisdiction simply by amending the language of the RHA. To its credit,
what Congress did instead was pen an entirely different type of
legislation with an entirely different focus in another area of the United
States Code.45
35

Tyler Moore, Defining “Waters of the United States”: Canals, Ditches, and
Drains, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 37, 39 (2004).
36
Donna M. Downing et al., Navigating Through Clean Water Act Jurisdiction: A
Legal Review, 23 WETLANDS 475, 477 (2003).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Administrative Procedure, 33 Fed. Reg. 18,670 (Dec. 18, 1968).
40
Id. at 18,672.
41
Id. at 18,671.
42
Id. at 18,673.
43
Id.
44
See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
45
The RHA focuses on regulating obstructions to navigation, alterations of channels,
and depositing refuse into navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403, 407 (2006). The
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C. Jurisdiction under the CWA: The Crooked Stream
Both the Corps’ expanding interpretation of its jurisdiction under
the RHA and the RHA’s failure to fully address the growing problems of
water pollution could not continue indefinitely. Congress responded to
the widening gap in federal legislation by enacting the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, commonly referred to as the
Clean Water Act (“CWA”).46 The CWA comprised a comprehensive
legislative anti-pollution scheme and also set the stage for the difficulties
to come, including a misplaced anchor in federal navigation servitude
and bifurcation of administrative duties between the EPA and the Army
Corps of Engineers.47
In enacting the CWA, Congress retained the “navigable waters”
language of the RHA to indicate the Corps’ jurisdiction under the new
legislation.48 Congress made it clear that it intended the term “navigable
waters” to embody the “broadest possible constitutional interpretation.”49
The Committee on Public Works’ report to the House demonstrated this
intention:
One term that the Committee was reluctant to define was the
term “navigable waters.” The reluctance was based on the fear
that any interpretation would be read narrowly. However, this is
not the Committee’s intent. The Committee fully intends that the
term “navigable waters” be given the broadest possible
constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency

RHA is located in Title 33, Chapter 9 of the U.S. Code, which addresses the “protection
of navigable waters and of harbor and river improvements generally.” The CWA, by
contrast, was intended to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006). The CWA is located in
Title 33, Chapter 26 of the U.S. Code, which addresses “water pollution prevention and
control research and related programs.”
46
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816
(1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-63, 1265, 1281-92, 1311-26, 1328,
1341-45, 1361-76 (2006)). Congress passed the bill overwhelmingly. While the House of
Representatives passed the bill by a margin of 366 to 11, the Senate passed the bill
unanimously. See 118 CONG. REC. 36,774 (Oct. 17, 1972), 118 CONG. REC. 37,055 (Oct.
18, 1972). President Nixon vetoed. Message of President Nixon on Vetoing S. 2770, 8
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 43 (Oct. 17, 1972). However, Congress overrode it the
following day. Id.; see 118 CONG. REC. 36,879 (Oct. 17, 1972), 118 CONG. REC. 37,060
(Oct. 18, 1972).
47
See infra notes 48, 53-56 and accompanying text.
48
See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006) (“The Secretary may issue permits . . . for the
discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters . . . .”)
49
H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 131 (1972); see H.R. REP. NO. 92-1465, at 144 (1972)
(Conf. Rep.).
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determinations which have been made or may be made for
administrative purposes.50

A Senate-House Conference Committee Report echoed this language and
affirmed Congress’s intent.51 In the end, Congress used broad and vague
language in Section 502 of the CWA by defining the term “navigable
waters” to mean “the waters of the United States, including the territorial
seas.”52
The CWA’s creation of a dual source of jurisdictional interpretation
would muddy the waters for years to come. In section 101 of the CWA,
Congress provided that the “Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency . . . shall administer” the CWA.53 This delegation not
only gave the Administrator of the EPA considerable discretion in
interpreting the CWA, but also set the framework for future
misinterpretations of the CWA by both the EPA and the Corps, which
would administer the permit programs under the CWA with supervision
by the EPA.
Section 404 of the CWA granted the Secretary of the Army,
through the Chief of Engineers, authority to regulate “discharge of
dredged or fill material into navigable waters” at particular disposal
sites.54 The Secretary of the Army was to specify a disposal site for each
permit “through the application of guidelines developed by the [EPA]
Administrator, in conjunction with the Secretary.” 55 The CWA provided
that the EPA Administrator’s and the Secretary’s guidelines must be
“based upon criteria comparable to the criteria applicable to the territorial
seas, the contiguous zone, and the ocean under [section 403 of the
CWA].”56 The guidelines under section 403 of the CWA include:
(A) the effect of disposal of pollutants on human health or
welfare, including but not limited to plankton, fish, shellfish,
wildlife, shorelines, and beaches;
(B) the effect of disposal of pollutants on marine life including
the transfer, concentration, and dispersal of pollutants or their
byproducts through biological, physical, and chemical processes;
changes in marine ecosystem diversity, productivity, and
stability; and species and community population changes;
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 131.
H.R. REP. NO. 92-1465, at 144.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2006).
Clean Water Act § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (2006).
Clean Water Act § 404(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006).
Clean Water Act § 404(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b)(1) (2006).
Id.
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(C) the effect of disposal, of pollutants on esthetic, recreation,
and economic values;
(D) the persistence and permanence of the effects of disposal of
pollutants;
(E) the effect of the disposal at varying rates, of particular
volumes and concentrations of pollutants;
(F) other possible locations and methods of disposal or recycling
of pollutants including land-based alternatives; and
(G) the effect on alternate uses of the oceans, such as mineral
exploitation and scientific study.57

Thus, whereas the RHA had previously limited the Corps objectives to
solely protect the physical navigability of the nation’s waterways, the
CWA expanded the Corps’ focus to address critical issues of pollution of
the nation’s waterways.
In keeping with its own mandate within the CWA to read
“navigable waters” as broadly as possible, the Corps promulgated a rule
establishing the outer limits of its jurisdiction in 1974.58 The Corps
defined “navigable waters of the United States” and “navigable waters”
as “those waters of the United States which are subject to the ebb and
flow of the tide, and/or are presently, or have been in the past, or may be
in the future susceptible for use for purposes of interstate or foreign
commerce.”59 This expansive reading seems to reflect the Corps’
responsiveness to the growing problem of pollution in the United States
in the 1970s and to Congress’s intent that “navigable waters” be given
the broadest possible reading allowed under the Constitution.
Far from curtailing the Corps’ ruling, one federal court has insisted
that the Corps construe its jurisdiction even more broadly.60 In July of
1975, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
ordered the Corps to rescind the portion of their 1974 rule “as limits the
permit jurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers by definition or otherwise
to other than ‘the waters of the United States’” and to “[p]ublish within
forty (40) days . . . proposed regulations clearly recognizing the full
regulatory mandate of the [CWA].”61 The district court thus ordered the

57
58
59
60
61

Clean Water Act § 403, 33 U.S.C. § 1343(c)(1) (2006).
Administrative Procedure, 39 Fed. Reg. 12,115 (April 3, 1974).
Id. at 12,119.
See Natural Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
Id. at 686 (emphasis added).
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Corps to extend its jurisdiction “to the maximum extent possible under
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.”62
In response, the Corps issued interim final regulations that included
a redefinition of “navigable waters” for purposes of section 404 of the
CWA.63 The new “navigable waters” encompassed all coastal waters
shoreward to their mean high water mark and all coastal wetlands
capable of supporting vegetation that requires saturated soil conditions.64
Inland “navigable waters” included all navigable rivers, lakes, and
streams and their tributaries (primary, secondary, tertiary, etc.), and all
interstate waters.65 Jurisdiction extended to intrastate waters that have
recreational, fishing, industrial or agricultural connection to interstate
commerce and adjacent wetlands capable of supporting vegetation that
requires saturated soil conditions.66 “Manmade canals . . . navigated by
recreational or other craft” were also included.67 Drainage and irrigation
ditches were excluded, but the new definition gave the District Engineer
discretion to regulate “ecologically valuable water bodies [and]
environmentally damaging practices” on a case-by-case basis.68
The Corps thus gave effect to the district court’s order to expand
“navigable waters” jurisdiction to the outer limits of the Commerce
Clause, as Congress contemplated in crafting the Clean Water Act of
1972.69 Shortly thereafter, the House of Representatives introduced a bill
that sought to narrow the Corps’ jurisdiction.70 The proposed legislation
generated considerable debate.71
D. The Clean Water Act of 1977 and its Effect on Jurisdiction
In 1977, following the Corps’ promulgation of interim final
regulations in 1975 and broad assertion of jurisdiction thereafter,
Congress considered interim amendments to the Clean Water Act.72 The
House introduced House Bill 3199 and referred it to the Committee on
Public Works and Transportation.73 The Committee noted in House
62

Id.
Administrative Procedure, 40 Fed. Reg. 31,320 (July 25, 1975).
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 31,321.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
See supra notes 49-51, 64-69 and accompanying text.
70
See Clean Water Act of 1977, H.R. 3199, 95th Cong. (as introduced by Rep.
Roberts and referred to the H. Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., Feb. 17, 1977).
71
See 123 CONG. REC. 26,690 (1977).
72
Clean Water Act of 1977, H.R. 3199, 95th Cong. (as introduced by Rep. Roberts
and referred to the H. Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., Feb. 17, 1977).
73
Id.
63
64
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Report 139 that this major piece of legislation must focus on achieving
“interim improvements within the existing framework” of the Clean
Water Act of 1972.74 The Committee noted that a “limited, selective list
of relatively modest adjustments can and must be enacted immediately,”
and that House Bill 3199 “contains those amendments of most pressing
urgency.”75
House Bill 3199 proposed a redefinition of “navigable waters” as
they applied to section 404 to include only waters “presently used, or
susceptible of use in their natural condition or by reasonable
improvement” in interstate commerce.76 The bill limited Section 404
jurisdiction to those waters and their adjacent wetlands, which it defined
as wetlands periodically inundated by contiguous navigable waters and
normally supporting vegetation that required saturated soil.77 Debate
ended on the House floor with an adoption of the narrowed definition of
“waters.”78
The Senate bill contained no such redefinition.79 Instead, the Senate
approached the problem of Corps overregulation by first limiting the
activities over which the Corps would have jurisdiction and then
delegating some responsibility for regulation to federally approved state
programs.80 Debate on the Senate floor defeated an amendment
proposing adoption of the House’s redefinition of “waters”; thus, the
Corps’ expansive definition of “waters” remained unchanged.81
Eventually, the House abandoned its efforts to narrow the definition
of “waters.” The Senate’s approach prevailed in the final version of the
Clean Water Act of 1977 signed into law by President Carter.82 In
Senator Baker’s words, “the legislation as ultimately passed . . .
‘retain[ed] the comprehensive jurisdiction over the Nation’s waters
exercised in the 1972 [Clean Water Act].’”83 Regulation going forward
would necessarily focus less on the navigability of the waters being
regulated and more on the activity that endangered them.
74

H.R. REP. NO. 95-139, at 1-2 (1977).
Id. at 2.
Clean Water Act of 1977, H.R. 3199, 95th Cong. § 16(b) (as introduced by Rep.
Roberts and referred to the H. Comm. on Pub. Works and Transp., Feb. 17, 1977).
77
Id.
78
Clean Water Act of 1977, H.R. 3199, 95th Cong. § 216 (as passed by the House of
Representatives, Apr. 5, 1977).
79
S. REP. NO. 95-370, at 56, 65 (1977).
80
Id. at 65-72.
81
123 CONG. REC. 26,690 (1977).
82
Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977) (codified at 33
U.S.C. §§ 1281(a), 1294-97 (2006)).
83
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 136 (1985)
(quoting 123 CONG. REC. 39,209 (1977)) (first alteration in original).
75
76
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E. State Permitting Provision under the Clean Water Act of 1977
The Clean Water Act of 1977 represents the latest major revision to
the Clean Water Act. Although the House, in considering this new
legislation, was unable to form a consensus to narrow CWA jurisdiction,
Congress reached at least one important compromise with the States. The
Clean Water Act of 1977 included a provision for federally approved
state permit programs to replace Corps regulation of fill material
discharge under certain conditions.84 However, the provision did not
allow States to supersede the Corps’ jurisdiction to regulate fill discharge
into waters that were actually navigable or waters subject to the ebb and
flow of the tide, “including wetlands adjacent thereto.”85
As discussed supra, the fact that states had declined to take a
proactive stance in controlling pollution in the nation’s waterways
spawned the original Clean Water Act of 1972.86 Indeed, granting states
the power to administer permit programs under the Clean Water Act has
not induced states to do so.87 As one EPA administrator would observe
nearly twenty years after the Clean Water Act of 1977’s enactment,
“States and Tribes may assume operation of the section 404 program,
and to date two have done so (Michigan and New Jersey).”88 This
statement is powerful evidence that ambivalence among the states to the
water pollution problem persists and the Corps’ jurisdiction is the only
thing that stands between the health of the nation’s waters and the
ravages of water pollution.
F. EPA and Corps Definitions Conflict
In the same year Congress passed the Clean Water Act of 1977, the
Corps finalized its 1975 interim rule and notably changed the term to be
defined from “navigable waters” to the “waters of the United States” to
more closely follow the CWA’s language.89 Two years later, the EPA
revised its definition of “waters of the United States,” adding the phrase
84

33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(1) (2006).
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 138 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1344(g)(1)).
86
See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
87
See Interpreting the Effect of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Recent Decision in the
Joint Cases of Rapanos v. United States and Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
on “The Waters of the United States”: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries,
Wildlife, and Water of the S. Comm. on Env’t and Pub.Works, 109th Cong. 7 (2006)
(statement of Benjamin H. Grumbles, Assistant Administrator for Water, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency and John Paul Woodley, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the
Army for Civil Works, Department of the Army).
88
Id. (emphasis added).
89
Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,144 (July
19, 1977).
85
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“waters the use, degradation, or destruction of which would affect or
could affect” interstate commerce.90 The EPA’s definition, therefore, was
broader than the Corps’ definition. The two authorities were under a
statutory mandate to cooperate, and regulated individuals would be
significantly affected by any confusion between them. The discrepancy
in the definitions, therefore, presented a potentially serious problem.
To resolve the question, the Secretary of the Army sent a letter on
March 29, 1979 to the Attorney General of the United States.91 The letter
requested the Attorney General’s opinion on “whether the [Clean Water]
Act gives ultimate administrative authority to determine the reach of the
term ‘navigable water’ for purposes of [section] 404” to the Secretary of
the Army or the EPA Administrator.92 Later that year, the U.S. Attorney
General answered by issuing an opinion stating that “the structure and
intent of the Act support an interpretation of [section] 404 that gives the
[EPA] Administrator the final administrative responsibility” for
construing the term.93
Some years later, in 1986, the Corps issued final regulations
consolidating six rulemaking events and revising its definition of “waters
of the United States” to match that of the EPA.94 Later still in 1989, the
two authorities entered a Memorandum of Agreement pursuant to the
Attorney General’s 1979 letter and “set[ting] forth an appropriate
allocation of responsibilities between the EPA and U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (Corps) to determine the geographic jurisdiction of the Section
404 program.”95 This consolidation of definitions and clarification of
responsibilities brings the discussion to the current state of the term
“waters of the United States.”
G. Present Definition of the “Waters of the United States”
The language in the 1986 final regulations issued by the Army
Corps of Engineers tracks precisely the regulations promulgated earlier

90

National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System; Revision of Regulations, 44
Fed. Reg. 32,854, 32,901 (June 7, 1979).
91
43 Op. Att’y Gen. 197 (1979).
92
Id. at 1.
93
Id. at 11.
94
Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg.
41,206 (Nov. 13, 1986).
95
Memorandum of Agreement between the Army Corps of Eng’rs and the Envtl.
Prot. Agency (Jan. 19, 1989), http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/guidance/404f.html;
see Wetlands Regulation and the SWANCC Decision: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Env’t and Pub.Works, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of G. Tracy Mehan, Assistant
Administrator for Water, Environmental Protection Agency).
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by the EPA.96 The Corps’ definition of “waters of the United States”
under section 404 of the CWA now reads:
(1) All waters which are currently used, or were used in the past,
or may be susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce,
including all waters which are subject to the ebb and flow of the
tide;
(2) All interstate waters including interstate wetlands;
(3) All other waters such as intrastate lakes, rivers, streams
(including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands,
sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or natural
ponds, the use, degradation or destruction of which could affect
interstate or foreign commerce including any such waters:
(i) Which are or could be used by interstate or foreign
travelers for recreational or other purposes; or
(ii) From which fish or shellfish are or could be taken
and sold in interstate or foreign commerce; or
(iii) Which are used or could be used for industrial
purpose by industries in interstate commerce;
(4) All impoundments of waters otherwise defined as waters of
the United States under the definition;
(5) Tributaries of waters identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through
(4) of this section;
(6) The territorial seas;
(7) Wetlands adjacent to waters (other than waters that are
themselves wetlands) identified in paragraphs (a)(1) through (6)
of this section.97

Both authorities also provide that “[w]aters of the United States do
not include prior converted cropland” and that “[n]otwithstanding the
determination of an area’s status as prior converted cropland by any
other federal agency, for the purposes of the Clean Water Act, the final
authority regarding Clean Water Act jurisdiction remains with EPA.”98
96
97
98

See 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s) (2006).
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a) (2006).
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(8); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(3).
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The regulations also provide that “[w]aste treatment systems, including
treatment ponds or lagoons designed to meet the requirements of CWA
. . . are not waters of the United States.”99 Thus, there is only one
definition today of “waters of the United States,” as broad as possible
under the Commerce Clause, promulgated by the two bodies authorized
to regulate those waters under the CWA.100
II. RECENT LEGAL BACKGROUND: THE “PUSH-ME-PULL-YOU” OF CWA
JURISDICTION
The EPA and the Corps give the term “waters of the United States”
an extraordinarily broad reading.101 The federal courts may not issue
advisory opinions, however, because judicial power is constitutionally
limited to deciding cases or controversies.102 Thus, the CWA’s
administrators and regulated parties must wait for a contested case to
reach the courts to learn the courts’ position on the matter of Clean
Water Act jurisdiction.
In the meantime, the EPA must respond to political and executive
pressure and the Corps must update its rulings to conform to new EPA
policies regarding CWA jurisdiction.103 These regulatory rulings are
always subject to some level of judicial scrutiny.104 The sections that
99

33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s)(7).
See 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a); see also 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s).
101
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a); 40 C.F.R. § 230.3(s).
102
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
103
Memorandum of Agreement between the Army Corps of Eng’rs & the Envtl. Prot.
Agency, pt. II (Jan. 19, 1989), http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/guidance/404f.html
(“It shall . . . be the policy of the Army and EPA that the Corps shall fully implement
EPA guidance on determining the geographic extent of [CWA] section 404 jurisdiction
and applicability of the 404(f) exemptions.”).
104
The Administrative Procedure Act, which governs judicial review of agency
action, provides in relevant part:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms
of an agency action. The reviewing court shall—
...
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be—
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law;
(B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity;
(C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right;
(D) without observance of procedure required by law;
(E) unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556
and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency
hearing provided by statute; or
100
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follow trace the recent legal dialogue between the judiciary and the
Corps, and the inevitable confusion this dialogue has caused in the lower
federal courts.
A. The Supreme Court Affirms “Waters of the United States” Includes
Adjacent Wetlands: Riverside Bayview
In 1985, the Supreme Court in Riverside Bayview held that Clean
Water Act jurisdiction included wetlands adjacent to traditional
navigable waters.105 The Court noted that the borders of wetlands often
could not readily be distinguished from the navigable waters that fed into
them.106 The Court also noted, importantly, that Corps expertise should
weigh heavily in these types of scientific decisions.107 Although this
decision appears to be a victory for the Corps, in later years Riverside
Bayview would be used to argue for limitations on CWA jurisdiction.
In Riverside Bayview, a development corporation owned “80 acres
of low-lying, marshy land near the shores of Lake St. Clair in Macomb
County, Michigan.”108 In preparation for building a housing development
on this marshy land, the corporation piled a significant amount of fill
without first obtaining a permit under § 404 of the Clean Water Act.109
The Corps sued in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Michigan to enjoin the corporation from filling in their
wetlands without a permit.110 The District court held that the CWA
applied to the company’s land and the Corps had jurisdiction over it.111
The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding the wetlands were not “adjacent
to navigable waters.”112 The court based its opinion on the fact that the
area did not support the type of aquatic vegetation that requires frequent

(F) unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are subject to trial de
novo by the reviewing court.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006).
105
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 139 (1985).
106
Id. at 132 (“In determining the limits of its power to regulate discharges under the
[CWA], the Corps must necessarily choose some point at which water ends and land
begins. Our common experience tells us that this is often no easy task: the transition from
water to solid ground is not necessarily or even typically an abrupt one.”).
107
Id. at 134 (“In view of the breadth of federal regulatory authority contemplated by
the [CWA] itself and the inherent difficulties of defining precise bounds to regulable
waters, the Corps’ ecological judgment about the relationship between waters and their
adjacent wetlands provides an adequate basis for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands
may be defined as waters under the [CWA].”).
108
Id. at 124.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id. at 125.
112
Id.
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flooding.113 The court noted that a broader reading of CWA jurisdiction
would violate the takings doctrine.114 The court also found that Congress
did not contemplate giving the Corps jurisdiction over wetlands that were
not flooded by nearby navigable waters.115
The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit.116 First, the Court
noted there was no inherent takings problem, stating that “[w]e have
frequently suggested that governmental land-use regulation may under
extreme circumstances amount to a ‘taking’ of the affected property.”117
The Court noted that “we have made it quite clear that the mere assertion
of regulatory jurisdiction by a governmental body does not constitute a
regulatory taking.”118 The Court noted that “[a] requirement that a person
obtain a permit before engaging in a certain use of his or her property
does not itself ‘take’ the property in any sense.”119 Finally, the Court
noted that federal law requires the government to compensate private
landowners and that the mere specter of a takings problem does not
justify curtailing Clean Water Act jurisdiction.120
Next, the Riverside Bayview Court turned to section 323.2(c)’s
plain language and found the corporation’s property constituted a
“wetland.”121 The regulatory language stated that ground water may

113

Id.
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 126.
117
Id. (emphasis added).
118
Id. (“[O]ur general approach [is] . . . that the application of land-use regulations to
a particular piece of property is a taking only ‘if the ordinance does not substantially
advance legitimate state interests . . . or denies an owner economically viable use of his
land.’” (quoting Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)); see Hodel v. Va. Surface
Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 293-297 (1981).
119
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 127 (“[A]fter all, the very existence of a permit
system implies that permission may be granted, leaving the landowner free to use the
property as desired. Moreover, even if the permit is denied, there may be other viable
uses available to the owner. Only when a permit is denied and the effect of the denial is
to prevent ‘economically viable’ use of the land in question can it be said that a taking
has occurred.”).
120
Id. at 128 (“Because the Tucker Act, which presumptively supplies a means of
obtaining compensation for any taking that may occur through the operation of a federal
statute, is available to provide compensation for takings that may result from the Corps’
exercise of jurisdiction over wetlands, the Court of Appeals’ fears that application of the
Corps’ permit program might result in a taking did not justify the court in adopting a
more limited view of the Corps’ authority than the terms of the relevant regulation might
otherwise support.” (citations omitted)).
121
Id. at 129 (“Wetlands . . . are defined as lands that are ‘inundated or saturated by
surface or ground water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under
normal circumstances do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in
saturated soil conditions.’”) (quoting 33 C.F.R.§ 323.2(c) (1985)).
114
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support aquatic vegetation and trigger CWA jurisdiction.122 The Court
noted that the land in question supported the type of aquatic vegetation
outlined in the regulatory language.123 The Court noted that nothing in
the regulatory language says that the wetland must be flooded by an
adjacent body of water as the circuit court stated.124 Further, the Court
noted the “frequent flooding” requirement injected by the circuit court
reinstated the exact regulatory structure that the Corps rejected in
1976.125 The Court found that the circuit court’s construction of CWA
jurisdiction was invalid.126
The Court then found that the corporation’s wetlands were
“adjacent” to a navigable water under section 323.2.127 The wetland’s
aquatic vegetation extended to Black Creek, which was a navigable
waterway.128 The Court found the corporation’s wetland was part of the
“waters of the United States” as defined under the CWA and subject to
Corps jurisdiction.129
Finally, the Court determined the Corps acted reasonably within the
Act by exercising jurisdiction over wetlands that are “adjacent to but not
regularly flooded by rivers, streams, and other hydrographic features
more conventionally identifiable as ‘waters.’”130 First, the Court noted it
was not an easy task for the Corps to determine where water ends and
solid ground begins.131 The Court found the Corps appropriately looked
to legislative history and the underlying policies of the CWA for
guidance.132 The Court noted that neither source was clear.133 However,
the Court found that when taken together, the sources supported the
Corps’ determination of the corporation’s adjacent wetlands as “waters”
within the meaning of the Clean Water Act.134
The CWA’s objective, the Court noted, is “‘to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters.’”135 The Court observed that Congress intended “integrity” under
122

Id.
Id. at 130.
124
Id. at 129.
125
Id. at 130.
126
Id. (“In fashioning its own requirement of ‘frequent flooding’ the Court of Appeals
improperly reintroduced into the regulation precisely what the Corps had excised.”).
127
Id. at 131.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 132.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251).
123
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the Clean Water Act to mean “‘a condition in which the natural structure
and function of ecosystems [are] maintained.’”136 The Court also noted
that Congress recognized that protection of aquatic ecosystems demands
broad federal jurisdiction because “‘[water] moves in hydrologic cycles
and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at the
source.’”137 Further, the Court explained that “the [CWA]’s definition of
‘navigable waters’ as ‘the waters of the United States’ makes it clear that
the term ‘navigable’ as used in the [CWA] is of limited import.138
The Court noted that, following the EPA’s lead, the Corps stated
the following in its 1977 rulemaking:
The regulation of activities that cause water pollution cannot
rely on . . . artificial lines . . . but must focus on all waters that
together form the entire aquatic system. Water moves in
hydrologic cycles, and the pollution of this part of the aquatic
system . . . will affect the water quality of the other waters within
that aquatic system.
For this reason, the landward limit of Federal jurisdiction
under [s]ection 404 must include any adjacent wetlands that form
the border of or are in reasonable proximity to other waters of
the United States, as these wetlands are part of this aquatic
system.139

The Riverside Bayview Court accepted the Corps’ justification.140 The
Court concluded that it was not unreasonable that the Corps’ scientific
judgment would produce the legal judgment that adjacent wetlands are
“waters” under the CWA, given the breadth of regulatory authority
contemplated by the Clean Water Act and the inherent problems in
defining precise boundaries of waters subject to regulation.141
The Court further accepted that, even if the water in the wetlands
did not come from an adjacent body of open water, jurisdiction applies
because the water from the wetlands could still have a tendancy to drain
into those open waters.142 The Court further found that the Corps had
reasonably determined such wetlands may serve to filter and purify such
water, which provided a valid basis to deny a building permit to the
136

Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 92-911, at 76 (1972)).
Id. at 133 (quoting S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 77 (1972)).
138
Id.; see S. REP. NO. 92-1236, at 144 (1972) (Conf. Rep.); see also 118 CONG. REC.
33,756-57 (1972).
139
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 133-34 (quoting Regulatory Programs of the Corps
of Engineers, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,128 (July 19, 1977)) (emphasis added).
140
Id. at 134.
141
Id.
142
Id.
137
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corporation.143 Moreover, the Court accepted the Corps’ reasonable
determination that such waters trapped in wetlands may slow the
drainage to lakes, rivers and streams, thus preventing flooding and
erosion.144 Finally, the Court accepted the Corps’ reasonable
determination that adjacent wetlands “may ‘serve significant natural
biological functions, including food chain production, general habitat,
and nesting, spawning, rearing and resting sites for aquatic . . .
species.’”145
Perhaps the most striking feature of the Riverside Bayview opinion
was that the Court gave great weight to the scientific expertise of the
Army Corps of Engineers. In its unwillingness to substitute its judgment
for that of the Corps, the Court found not only the Corps’ interpretation
of the CWA was entitled to Chevron deference, but also that the Corps’
interpretation was reasonable. This exercise of deference would stand in
stark contrast to later opinions, particularly in Rapanos v. United
States.146 In the meantime, however, the administrators had no reason to
believe the Supreme Court would question their authority. As a result,
they forged ahead with bold jurisdictional rulings under the Clean Water
Act.147
B. The Corps Further Expands CWA Jurisdiction: The “Migratory Bird
Rule” and “Ephemeral Streams”
Buoyed perhaps by the 1985 Riverside Bayview opinion, the Army
Corps issued a final ruling the following year. In what has been dubbed
the “Migratory Bird Rule,” the Corps announced that its jurisdiction
under Clean Water Act extended to intrastate waters that, inter alia,
provide habitat for migratory birds.148 The Corps based its ruling on an
EPA regulation stating the waters of the United States included those:
143

Id.; see 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b) (2006) (authorizing the Corps to consider effect on
wetlands when issuing building permits, including wetlands which serve “significant
water purification functions”).
144
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 134; see 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(2)(iv)-(v) (2006).
145
Riverside Bayview, 474 U.S. at 134-35 (quoting 33 C.F.R. § 320.4(b)(2)(i) (1985)).
146
Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006); see also Solid Waste Agency of
N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). In 1985, the year
Riverside Bayview was decided, the Supreme Court consisted of Chief Justice Burger and
Associate Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, O’Connor, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens,
and White. In 2006, Rapanos was decided by a Supreme Court consisting of Chief Justice
Roberts and Associate Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, O’Connor, Scalia, Stevens,
Souter, and Thomas. Only two Justices remained from the Riverside Bayview Court:
Justices Stevens and O’Connor.
147
See discussion infra Part II.B.
148
Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg.
41,206, 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
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(a) Which are or would be used as habitat by birds protected by
Migratory Bird Treaties; or
(b) Which are or would be used as habitat by other migratory
birds which cross state lines; or
(c) Which are or would be used as habitat for endangered
species; or
(d) Used to irrigate crops sold in interstate commerce.149

The Corps may not have considered this statement of jurisdiction
farfetched. Indeed, no fewer than two circuit courts that considered the
question upheld the Migratory Bird Rule.150 In fact, the regulation stood
unmolested until the Supreme Court invalidated it fifteen years later.151
In the year prior to the Supreme Court’s invalidation of the
Migratory Bird Rule, the Corps issued another final rule.152 This
regulation asserted CWA jurisdiction over waters with no constant
flow.153 The ruling stated that the “waters of the United States” included
“ephemeral streams,” “drainage ditches,” and “tributaries” with a
perceptible “ordinary high water mark.”154 The ruling cited to the
existing definition of “ordinary high water mark,” identified by a “line on
the shore established by the fluctuations of water” and could be indicated
by a “clear, natural line,” or “shelving, changes in character of soil,
destruction of . . . vegetation, the presence of litter and debris, or other
appropriate means.”155 The Supreme Court later characterized the ruling
as “extend[ing] ‘the waters of the United States’ to . . . any land feature
over which rainwater or drainage passes and leaves a visible mark.”156
These two broad rulings created a framework for resistance from
the Supreme Court and ensuing confusion among the circuit courts. The
Court struck down the Migratory Bird Rule, holding that the CWA did
not grant the Corps jurisdiction over isolated intrastate waters.157 Some
149

Id.
See Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990); see also
Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. Adm’r, United States E.P.A., 999 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
151
See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531
U.S. 159 (2001).
152
Final Notice of Issuance and Modification of Nationwide Permits, 65 Fed. Reg.
12,818 (Mar. 9, 2000).
153
Id.
154
Id. at 12,823.
155
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(e) (2006).
156
Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2217 (2006).
157
See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531
U.S. 159 (2001).
150
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courts, however, interpreted the holding to mean that the CWA granted
jurisdiction only over waters that had a significant physical connection to
navigable waters, as in Riverside Bayview.158 This disparity in
interpretation among the lower courts created a circuit split that has yet
to heal.159
C. The Supreme Court Shoots Down the Migratory Bird Rule: SWANCC
In 2001, the Supreme Court issued its first decision that
categorically limited the Corps’ jurisdiction under the Clean Water
Act.160 The Corps, the Court reasoned, had gone beyond its
Congressional mandate in enacting the Migratory Bird Rule.161 The
Court held that the goal of protecting migratory birds’ habitat was
insufficient to confer jurisdiction, and that the CWA required some
“nexus” to navigable waters.162
In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers (“SWANCC”), a group of suburban Chicago
municipalities had selected an abandoned sand and gravel pit as a solid
waste disposal site.163 The pit featured excavation trenches that had
evolved into permanent and seasonal ponds.164 The Chicago District of
the Army Corps of Engineers determined that it had jurisdiction under
subpart (b) of the Migratory Bird Rule and required the municipalities to
apply for a landfill permit.165 The Corps denied the permit because of the
municipalities’ failure to address certain requirements under section 404
of the CWA.166 The municipalities brought suit under the Administrative
Procedure Act, and the district court granted summary judgment to the
Corps on the jurisdictional issue.167 The Seventh Circuit affirmed,
holding that the Corps had jurisdiction under the cumulative impact
doctrine of the Commerce Clause and the Migratory Bird Rule to
regulate the sand and gravel pit, and as a threshold matter, the EPA’s
Migratory Bird Rule was a reasonable interpretation of its jurisdiction
under section 404 of the CWA.168
158

See discussion infra Part II.D.
See discussion infra Part II.D.
160
SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159.
161
Id. at 174.
162
Id. at 171-72.
163
Id. at 162-63.
164
Id. at 163.
165
Id. at 164.
166
Id. at 165.
167
Id.
168
Solid Waste Agency, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 191 F.3d 845, 850-52
(7th Cir. 1999).
159
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The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit in a 5-4
decision.169 The Court reasoned that the EPA’s Migratory Bird Rule
failed on constitutional grounds, including significant impingement of
the states’ traditional and primary power over land and water use.170 In
doing so, the SWANCC Court read the Clean Water Act conservatively to
avoid significant constitutional and federalism questions.171 The
SWANCC Court also rejected the Corps’ request for administrative
deference, a decision that stands in stark contrast to that of the Riverside
Bayview Court discussed supra.172
The SWANCC Court highlighted the importance of navigation to
federal jurisdiction under the CWA.173 The Court first reaffirmed that
“navigable” represented a lower standard than “navigable in fact” by
observing that “[w]e said in Riverside Bayview Homes that the word
‘navigable’ in the statute was of ‘limited effect’ and went on to hold that
[section] 404(a) extended to nonnavigable wetlands adjacent to open
waters.”174 However, the SWANCC Court hinted that it would limit the
Corps by stating “it is one thing to give a word limited effect and quite
another to give it no effect whatever.”175
Accordingly, the SWANCC Court refused to write “navigable
waters” out of the statute and observed that “[t]he term ‘navigable’ has at
least the import of showing us what Congress had in mind as its authority
for enacting the CWA: its traditional jurisdiction over waters that were or
had been navigable in fact or which could reasonably be so made.”176
The SWANCC Court held that “nonnagivable, isolated, intrastate waters”
were not a part of the “waters of the United States.”177 Through this lens,
the SWANCC Court majority viewed the isolated, sand-and-gravel pit in
Illinois. The Court found that because the pit lacked a connection with or
adjacency to a navigable or non-navigable interstate water, it fell outside
the reach of the Clean Water Act.178 Unfortunately, the SWANCC Court
majority failed to articulate a usable test for lower courts to apply to
future cases, and the holding was open to interpretation.

169
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The Fifth Circuit interpreted the opinion expansively to mean that
waters must be “truly adjacent” to qualify for Corps jurisdiction.179 Other
circuits took a very limited view of the holding, applying SWANCC to
instances involving truly isolated, intrastate waters.180 With no
affirmative test and little guidance going forward, the circuit courts
struggled to apply the SWANCC decision.
D. After SWANCC: The Flock Scatters
When Congress enacted the federal pollution control CWA
amendments in the 1970s, it delegated responsibility for determining
CWA jurisdiction to the EPA and the Corps.181 As discussed supra,
Congress indicated in their debates that it intended for the EPA and the
Corps to interpret their jurisdiction under the CWA to the outer limits of
the Commerce Clause.182 However, Congress placed a jurisdictional limit
in the CWA with statutory language limiting jurisdiction to navigable
waters.183 Under these conflicting political messages, the Corps was
forced to feel their way to the limits of their jurisdiction.184 When the
Supreme Court finally struck down one of the Corps’ rulings, the courts
below had little guidance other than Riverside Bayview to aid in deciding
future cases.185 Thus, it should come as little surprise that the circuits
split almost immediately.
1. The Fifth Circuit: CWA Jurisdiction Extends to Wetlands “Truly
Adjacent” to Navigable Waters
In Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., a decision reached the same
year as SWANCC, the Fifth Circuit applied the SWANCC holding very
aggressively.186 The Rice Court noted that “under [SWANCC], it appears
that a body of water is subject to regulation under the CWA if the body
of water is actually navigable or is adjacent to an open body of navigable
water.”187 The Rice Court attempted, as a matter of first impression, to
determine whether groundwater was protected under the Oil Protection
Act, the jurisdictional component of which, the court determined, was
179

See discussion infra Part II.D.1.
See discussion infra Part II.D.2.
181
See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
182
See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
183
See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2006) (“The Secretary may issue permits, after notice
and opportunity for public hearings for the discharge of dredged or fill material into the
navigable waters at specified disposal sites.”).
184
See discussion supra Parts II.A-C.
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See discussion supra Parts II.C-F.
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Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001).
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identical to the CWA’s.188 The court determined the only discharges in
question were onto dry land; therefore, the court did not reach the
question of whether a non-adjacent tributary would be protected.189
However, the Rice Court signaled its broad reading of SWANCC by
stating “a body of water is protected under the Act only if it is actually
navigable or is adjacent to an open body of navigable water.”190 Thus,
had the Rice Court reached the question, the court would likely have
ruled that a non-navigable secondary or tertiary tributary, or a nonadjacent wetland with a hydrological connection to a navigable water by
way of another body of water, would not be protected under the Clean
Water Act.
Two years later, the Fifth Circuit again addressed the CWA’s
jurisdictional reach.191 In In re Needham, the court noted that at least two
sister circuits read CWA jurisdiction broadly to cover “all waters,
excluding groundwater, that have any hydrological connection with
‘navigable water.’”192 The Needham Court stated, however, that “[i]n our
view, this definition is unsustainable under SWANCC.”193 The Needham
Court, contrary to the Riverside Bayview Court, opined that the Corps’
regulation was “not entitled to Chevron deference” because, if applied
broadly, CWA jurisdiction would be pushed “to the outer limits of the
Commerce Clause and raise serious constitutional questions.”194 The
Needham Court substituted its judgment for that of the Corps and
concluded that the term “adjacent” requires a “significant measure of
proximity,” and “including all ‘tributaries’ as ‘navigable waters’ would
negate Rice’s adjacency requirement, and extend [EPA jurisdiction]
beyond the limits . . . in SWANCC.”195 Following the Fifth Circuit’s own
precedent, the Needham Court held that the EPA had jurisdiction only
over “navigable-in-fact waters or . . . non-navigable waters (or wetlands)
that are truly adjacent to an open body of navigable water.”196
188

Id. at 267 (“The scope of the [Oil Protection Act] is an issue of first impression for
this Court.”). The court noted that “[t]he legislative history of the OPA and the textually
identical definitions of ‘navigable waters’ in the OPA and the CWA strongly indicate that
Congress generally intended the [jurisdictional] term ‘navigable waters’ to have the same
meaning in both the OPA and the CWA.” Id. The court asserted that “[a]ccordingly, the
existing case law interpreting the CWA is a significant aid in our present task of
interpreting the OPA.” Id. at 267-68.
189
Id. at 270.
190
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In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2003).
192
Id. at 345; see United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003); see also
United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2003).
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2. The Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits: CWA Jurisdiction
Extends to Wetlands with “Some Nexus” to Navigable Waters
Two years after SWANCC, the Fourth Circuit held in United States
v. Deaton that the Corps’ interpretation of its own regulations merited a
combination of Seminole Rock and Chevron deference.197 The Deaton
Court found that a ditch that eventually drained into navigable waters
could reasonably be a “tributary” under the Corps’ regulations, and thus
the Corp could properly assert jurisdiction over the wetland in question
that was adjacent to such a ditch.198 The Deaton Court noted, “we do not
read SWANCC to hold that the [more narrow] 1974 regulations represent
the only permissible interpretation of the Clean Water Act.”199
Later that same year, in Treacy v. Newdunn Associates, L.L.P., the
Fourth Circuit held that Corps’ jurisdiction extends to all tributaries,
regardless of whether they are man-made.200 The Treacy Court noted that
the question should be whether the CWA’s goal of protecting the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation’s waters is
being undermined, not whether the body of water is man-made or
natural.201 The court stated that SWANCC required that a wetland be
“inseparably bound up with the ‘waters’ of the United States,” and that
only the Corps’ attempts at jurisdiction over waters that had “no

197

Deaton, 332 F.3d at 711-12. The Supreme Court announced its standard of judicial
deference to an agency’s statutory interpretation in its 1984 opinion in Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. NRDC, Inc.:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in
the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). The Court went on to say that the court should not
substitute its own judgment for that of the agency. Id. at 843 n.11 (“The court need not
conclude that the agency construction was the only one it permissibly could have adopted
to uphold the construction, or even the reading the court would have reached if the
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hydrological connection whatsoever to navigable waters” would fail
under SWANCC.202
In the Sixth Circuit, six years before the SWANCC decision was
handed down, Michigander John Rapanos was convicted of unlawfully
filling wetlands in violation of the Clean Water Act.203 In 1997, Rapanos
appealed, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.204 Rapanos appealed
a second time, and this time the Supreme Court granted certiorari and
remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit to review in light of SWANCC.205
The Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the district court.206 The district
court found that because Rapanos’s wetlands “were not ‘directly adjacent
to navigable waters,’ the government could not regulate them.”207 On
appeal, the Sixth Circuit disagreed.208 The court aligned itself with the
Fourth Circuit, which stated that wetlands draining into a ditch that
passes through other waterways to a navigable-in-fact water formed a
sufficient nexus to navigable waters to confer Clean Water Act
jurisdiction.209 The Sixth Circuit stated that “[b]ecause the wetlands are
adjacent to the [Labozinski] Drain and there exists a hydrological
connection among [Rapanos’] wetlands, the Drain, and the [navigable]
Kawkawlin River, we find an ample nexus to establish jurisdiction.210
The court reversed the district court and reinstated Rapanos’
convictions.211 Rapanos would revisit the Supreme Court three years
later; however, one should note that the Sixth Circuit gave SWANCC a
much different reading than did the Fifth Circuit.212
In the same year, the Seventh Circuit held in United States v. Rueth
Development Co. that surface hydrological connection, no matter how
attenuated, is sufficient for Corps jurisdiction under the CWA.213 The
Rueth Court found sufficient nexus in wetlands “adjacent to an unnamed
tributary of Dyer Ditch which is a tributary of Hard Ditch which is a
tributary of the [navigable] Little Calumet River.”214 Like the Sixth
Circuit, the court aligned itself with the Fourth Circuit in holding that
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United States v. Rapanos, 895 F. Supp. 165 (E.D. Mich. 1995).
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“adjacency” is established by a showing of almost any surface
hydrological connection.215
The same year that the Supreme Court issued the SWANCC ruling,
the Ninth Circuit addressed the issue of jurisdiction under the Clean
Water Act in Headwaters, Inc. v. Talent Irrigation District.216 The
Headwaters Court held that where there was a surface hydrologic
connection, even if intermittent, whereby a waterway was capable of
carrying pollutants to other “waters of the United States,” it was a
tributary to other waters of the United States and fell within CWA
jurisdiction under 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a).217 The Headwaters Court
believed that SWANCC had no bearing on their decision because the
irrigation ditches in question were not isolated.218
In each of the decisions above, the circuit courts dealt with the issue
of adjacency on a local level. Each circuit developed their own standard
for federal Clean Water Act jurisdiction under section 404, Riverside
Bayview, and SWANCC.219 Some circuits, including the Sixth Circuit,
continued to read CWA jurisdiction very broadly.220 The tension among
these broad interpretations of CWA jurisdiction, issues of federalism,
and private ownership interests, exacerbated by the cost of the permit
program to regulated individuals, would stretch the Clean Water Act to
its limits. In the absence of congressional action addressing the
jurisdictional issue, the Supreme Court weighed in once more.221
E. The Supreme Court Muddies the Waters: Rapanos v. United States’ 41-4 Split
As discussed supra, the United States brought suit under section
404 of the Clean Water Act against John Rapanos, a private developer
who filled Michigan wetlands lying near ditches or man-made drains that
eventually emptied into traditional navigable waters.222 In a separate
action, private developers, the Carabells, brought suit against United
States for denying their application under section 404 to fill their
Michigan wetlands, which were separated from a drainage ditch by an
impermeable berm.223 In both cases, the district court found federal
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jurisdiction over the wetlands under the CWA.224 In the first case, the
district court found that Rapanos’ wetlands were “adjacent to other
waters of the United States.”225 In the second, the district court found the
Carabells’ land was also “adjacent to neighboring tributaries of navigable
waters and has a significant nexus to ‘waters of the United States.’”226
In Rapanos, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the lower court, stating there
were “hydrological connections between all three sites and
corresponding adjacent tributaries of navigable waters” sufficient for
jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act.227 The Sixth Circuit also
affirmed Carabells, stating that the wetland was “adjacent” to navigable
waters.228 The Supreme Court consolidated the two cases to decide
“whether these wetlands constitute ‘waters of the United States’ under
the [CWA], and if so, whether the [CWA] is constitutional.”229
In Rapanos, the Supreme Court began with factual observations
about the Rapanos sites.230 The Supreme Court noted that “[t]he wetlands
at the Salzburg site are connected to a man-made drain, which drains into
Hoppler Creek, which flows into the [navigable] Kawkawlin River,
which empties into Saginaw Bay and Lake Huron.”231 Furthermore,
“[t]he wetlands at the Hines site are connect to . . . the ‘Rose Drain,’
which has a surface connection to the [navigable] Tittabawassee
River.”232 The Court went on to explain that “the wetlands at the Pine
River site have a surface connection to the [navigable] Pine River, which
flows into Lake Huron.”233 The Court also noted that “[i]t is not clear
whether the connections between [the Rapanos’] wetlands and the nearby
drains and ditches are continuous or intermittent, or whether the nearby
drains and ditches contain continuous or merely occasional flows of
water.”234
The Rapanos Court continued with observations regarding the
Carabells’ site. “A man-made drainage ditch runs along one side of the
[Carabells’] wetland,” the Court held, “separated from it by a 4-footwide man-made berm.”235 The Court continued that “[t]he ditch empties
224
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into another ditch or a drain, which connects to Auvase Creek, which
empties into Lake St. Clair.”236 The Court proceeded to evaluate federal
jurisdiction over both parties’ sites under the plain language of the Clean
Water Act, congressional intent in enacting the CWA and its
constitutionality.237 In Rapanos, the Supreme Court ultimately vacated
the Sixth Circuit judgment and remanded.238
1. The Plurality: Riverside Bayview and the 1954 Webster’s
Dictionary Definition of “Waters” Controls; States to Retain
Primary Pollution and Land/Water Use Responsibilities and Rights
The Rapanos plurality, written by Justice Scalia and joined by three
other Justices, began by reiterating the well-settled idea that “navigable
waters” under the plain language of the CWA is broader than traditional
navigable waters.239 The plurality opined that “waters of the United
States” does not include channels containing intermittent or ephemeral
flow.240 Relatively continuous flow, the plurality stated, is a necessary
condition for qualification as a “water.”241 A more expansive reading by
the Corps, the Rapanos plurality opined, would defeat the preservation of
“‘the primary responsibilities and rights of the States to prevent, reduce,
and eliminate pollution, [and] to plan the development and use . . . of
land and water resources.’”242 The Court referred to its decision in
SWANCC, stating an expansive reading of the regulations would “result
in a significant impingement of the States’ traditional and primary power
over land and water use.”243
In developing its working definition of “waters,” the plurality
referred to a 1954 edition of Webster’s New International Dictionary.244
According to the fifty-three-year-old definition of the word “waters,”245
the Court held that “the phrase ‘the waters of the United States’ includes
only those relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies
of water ‘forming geographic features’ that are described in ordinary
parlance as ‘streams[,]’ . . . oceans, rivers, [and] lakes,’” and cannot
236
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include “channels through which water flows intermittently or
ephemerally, or channels that periodically provide drainage for
rainfall.”246 Thus, the Court concluded, “[t]he Corps’ expansive
interpretation of the ‘waters of the United States’ is thus not ‘based on a
permissible construction of the statute.’”247
The plurality opined that to be subject to jurisdiction under the
CWA, a wetland must have a continuous surface connection to waters of
the United States.248 Wetlands that only have an “intermittent, physically
remote hydrologic connection to ‘waters of the United States’” lack the
“significant nexus” required by SWANCC.249 Thus, the Rapanos plurality
held that establishing whether wetlands are covered under the CWA
requires two findings: First, the adjacent channel must contain a
“relatively permanent body of water connected to traditional interstate
navigable waters,” and second, that the wetland has “a continuous
surface connection with that water, making it difficult to determine
where the ‘water’ ends and the ‘wetland’ begins.”250
The Rapanos plurality found that the Sixth Circuit applied an
incorrect standard to determine whether the wetlands at issue were
“waters of the United States.”251 Because of this error and the paucity of
the record, the plurality voted to remand the cases for further
proceedings.252 Justice Kennedy joined the plurality in its judgment only,
giving the Rapanos Court the fifth vote it needed.253
2. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence: CWA Requires a “Significant
Nexus” to Navigable Waters
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in Rapanos found that the
Sixth Circuit correctly recognized that a water or wetland constitutes
“navigable waters” under the CWA if it possesses a “significant nexus”
to waters that are navigable in fact or that could reasonably be so
made,254 but that it had not considered all the factors necessary to
determine that the lands in question had, or did not have, the requisite
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nexus.255 The nexus required, Justice Kennedy opined, “must be assessed
in terms of the [CWA]’s goals and purposes.”256 Justice Kennedy
observed that “Congress enacted the law to ‘restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.’”257
Congress pursued that objective, Justice Kennedy noted, “by restricting
dumping and filling in ‘navigable waters.’”258 The Corps’ recognition
that wetlands can perform critical functions related to the integrity of
other waters, such as pollutant trapping, flood control, and runoff
storage, serves as the rationale behind the CWA’s wetlands regulation.259
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence articulated a test for federal
jurisdiction over wetlands under the Clean Water Act:
[W]etlands possess the requisite nexus, and thus come within the
statutory phrase “navigable waters,” if the wetlands, either alone
or in combination with similarly situated lands in the region,
significantly affect the chemical, physical, and biological
integrity of other covered waters more readily understood as
“navigable.” When, in contrast, wetlands’ effects on water
quality are speculative or insubstantial, they fall outside the zone
fairly encompassed by the statutory term “navigable waters.”260

Thus, for CWA jurisdiction to attach under the Kennedy Test, there must
be a substantial nexus between the wetlands in question and the
chemical, physical, or biological properties of the open waters into which
those wetlands flow.
Justice Kennedy opined that the “Corps’ theory of jurisdiction in
these consolidated cases—adjacency to tributaries, however remote and
insubstantial—raises concerns that go beyond the Riverside Bayview
holding.”261 Absent more specific regulations, Justice Kennedy stated,
“the Corps must establish a significant nexus on a case-by-case basis
when it seeks to regulate wetlands based on adjacency to nonnavigable
tributaries” to avoid unreasonable applications of the CWA.262 Although
Justice Kennedy found that “the record contains evidence suggesting the
possible existence of a significant nexus,” the concurrence also found
that “neither the agency nor the reviewing courts properly considered the
issue.”263 Therefore, the concurrence recommended that the case be
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
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263

Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2236 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 2248.
Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006)).
Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12) (2006)).
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remanded for further consideration under the “controlling legal
standard.”264
3. Justice Stevens’ Dissent: Chevron Deference Applies
Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion, joined by three other Justices,
also found that Riverside Bayview “squarely controls these cases.”265
Justice Stevens noted that the question there was framed as whether the
CWA “authorizes the Corps to require landowners to obtain permits from
the Corps before discharging fill material into wetlands adjacent to
navigable bodies of water and their tributaries.”266 Applying Chevron
deference the Corps’ interpretation of their jurisdiction to include such
wetlands in their interpretation of “waters of the United States,” the
Riverside Bayview Court found such an interpretation was permissible.267
Turning to the cases at hand, Justice Stevens opined that in these
cases, which concern “wetlands that are adjacent to ‘navigable bodies of
water or their tributaries,’”268 the Corps had again “reasonably
interpreted its jurisdiction to cover non-isolated wetlands.”269 Justice
Stevens further noted that the Riverside Bayview Court found there is a
presumption that wetlands adjacent to tributaries possess sufficient nexus
to confer Corps jurisdiction.270 Observing that the Corps has
implemented such jurisdiction for over thirty years, Justice Stevens
opined that any change to that jurisdiction is properly left to “Congress
or the Corps rather than to the Judiciary,” noting that “[u]nless and until
[adversely affected persons] succeed in convincing Congress (or the
Corps) that clean water is less important today than it was in the 1970s,
we continue to owe deference to regulations . . . that all of the Justices on
the Court in 1985 recognized in Riverside Bayview.”271
Justice Stevens also found the plurality’s definition of “waters”
problematic, both logically and with respect to Supreme Court
jurisprudence.272 Justice Stevens also found problematic the canonic
construction the plurality relied upon to support its position that land use
regulation was a right, reserved to the States, that the Corps was not
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empowered to overcome,273 and that “adjacent” waters have a surface
hydrological connection requirement found nowhere in the Corps’
regulations.274 Justice Stevens observed that “[b]ecause there is
ambiguity in the phrase ‘waters of the United States’ and because
interpreting it broadly . . . advances the purpose of the [CWA], the
Corps’ approach [of regulating pollutants as they enter ditches or
streams] should command [Supreme Court] deference.”275 Justice
Stevens likewise found Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus”
requirement a superfluous addition to the Corps’ regulations, particularly
in light of the Riverside Bayview bright-line presumption that
nonadjacent wetlands are sufficiently connected to the waters of the
United States to confer Corps jurisdiction.276
4. Justice Breyer’s Dissent: The Corps Retains Control through
Rulemaking
In another dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer found that Congress
“intended to fully exercise its relevant Commerce Clause powers” by
using the expansive term “waters of the United States” in the Clean
Water Act and leaving it to the Army Corps of Engineers to create a
scientifically workable definition.277 Justice Breyer further found that,
although the Rapanos Court wrote an unnecessary “nexus” requirement
into the Clean Water Act, the Corps had plenary power to define the
term.278 Justice Breyer observed that if and when the Corps enacted such
a regulation, “the courts must give those regulations appropriate
deference [under Chevron].”279
F. Federal Court Inconsistency: The Next Wave
The 4-1-4 split decision in Rapanos signaled to the lower courts
that even the Supreme Court was at odds over the issue of Clean Water
Act jurisdiction. Worse, the split presented the lower courts with
logistical problems in discerning the precedential holding, if indeed there
was one. With several cases in the pipe, the circuits took on the
Herculean task of answering the question: “What next?”
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1. The Seventh Circuit Adopts the Kennedy Test
Immediately after the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Rapanos,
it remanded United States v. Gerke Excavating, Inc. to the Seventh
Circuit for further proceedings and factual findings.280 The Seventh
Circuit remanded Gerke Excavating to the United States District Court
for the Western District of Wisconsin with instructions to proceed
consistent with Justice Kennedy’s opinion.281 The Seventh Circuit stated
that Justice Kennedy’s test was “the narrowest ground to which the
majority of the Justices would have assented if forced to choose.”282
Therefore, the court concluded, the Kennedy Test governed future
proceedings.283 The court thus remanded to the district court with
instructions to follow the standard Justice Kennedy proposed in his
Rapanos concurrence.284
2. The Ninth Circuit Misapplies the Kennedy Test
The same summer the Rapanos decision was filed, the Ninth
Circuit upheld the Corps’ jurisdiction over Basalt Pond, a “rock quarry
pit that had filled with water from the surrounding aquifer, located next
to the [navigable] Russian River,” in Northern California River Watch v.
City of Healdsburg.285 The River Watch court based its conclusion,
however, on a misapplication of the Kennedy Test. The River Watch
court held the pond fell within CWA jurisdiction because it found a
“significant nexus” to a navigable river. However, the River Watch
court’s reasoning failed to consider Justice Kennedy’s observation that
“[a]s applied to wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters, the Corps’
. . . assertion of jurisdiction for those wetlands is sustainable under the
Act by showing adjacency alone. That is the holding of Riverside
Bayview.”286 Thus, the Ninth Circuit applied the Kennedy Test
needlessly.
3. The Northern District of Texas Refuses to Apply the Kennedy
Test
In the same year as the Rapanos decision, the Northern District of
Texas refused to even attempt the Kennedy Test. 287 In United States v.
280
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Chevron Pipe Line Co., a recent decision that released a large oil
corporation from civil liability under the CWA for discharging crude oil
into a creek and streambed, the district court stated flatly that “[b]ecause
[Justice] Kennedy failed to elaborate on the ‘significant nexus’ required,
this Court will look to the prior reasoning in this circuit.”288 The Chevron
court somewhat surprisingly rejected the Kennedy Test wholesale and
relied solely on pre-Rapanos Fifth Circuit decisions and the noncontrolling Rapanos plurality to find that the creek and streambed were
not navigable waters of the United States.289
4. The Middle District of Florida Applies Both the Plurality and the
Kennedy Tests
In United States v. Evans, the Middle District of Florida solved the
fragmented-court dilemma by applying both Rapanos’s plurality and
Kennedy Tests and then taking an “either/or” approach to find Corps
jurisdiction if either one or the other test was satisfied.290 The Evans
Court noted this approach was “consistent with Justice Stevens’
[dissenting] opinion,” which advocated such an approach in dicta.291
Indeed, the Evans Court’s approach would yield correct results under
most circumstances. However, in rare instances where water possessed a
slight surface hydrological connection and an insignificant nexus to
navigable waters, this approach would incorrectly yield a finding of
Corps jurisdiction over waters outside the scope of the Clean Water Act
under Rapanos.
III. ANALYSIS AND A DECENT PROPOSAL
Congress expressly stated the Clean Water Act’s purpose is “to
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation’s waters.”292 In other words, Congress intended this
legislation to control not only the physical navigability of the nation’s
waters as commercial conduits, but also to control the purity of the
nation’s waters threatened by widespread pollution. Seeing that the
growing problem of pollution in our nation’s waterways created a
national issue, both ideologically and physically, Congress sought to
reverse the degradation of those waterways.293
288

Id. at 613.
Id. at 615.
290
No. 3:05 CR 159 J 32HTS, 2006 WL 2221629 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 2, 2006).
291
Id. at *19.
292
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006).
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See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (“The objective of this Act is to restore and maintain the
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However, Congress has severely undermined the stated objective of
the Clean Water Act.294 First, it imposed upon the CWA’s administrators
a geographical jurisdictional constraint, which bound the CWA’s ambit
to the “waters of the United States.”295 This constraint made the stated
objective nearly impossible and set its administrators up for conflict with
the states and private landowners. Congress also indicated that the Clean
Water Act be construed to the furthest possible reaches of the Commerce
Clause, encouraging its administrators to act broadly.296 These
conflicting messages have crippled the CWA’s chances for success by
causing uncertainty in the Clean Water Act’s administrators and endless
confusion in the courts and amongst the regulated individuals.
It is well settled in our tripartite system of government that the
judicial branch has power to resolve legislative uncertainty, limited in the
case of congressional administrative delegation by the principle of
intelligibility, whereby any agency must be given an “intelligible
principle” under which to operate or the statute is invalid.297 The
Supreme Court has not said that the Clean Water Act lacks such an
intelligible principle. However, once the Supreme Court has spoken to
resolve a legislative uncertainty, how shall those words be interpreted?
Rapanos presents the lower courts with a particularly troublesome
puzzle. Evidence has already shown that proceeding with litigation on a
case-by-case basis produces inconsistent results.298 Justice Breyer
suggested in his Rapanos dissent that the Corps has plenary power to
define the waters of the United States scientifically, and thus resolve the
jurisdictional question.299 However, there is no indication that the Court

et al., Navigating Through Clean Water Act Jurisdiction: A Legal Review, 23 WETLANDS
475, 478 (2003) (“The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
(‘FWPCA’) were the landmark Congressional response to the need for a comprehensive
effort to control water pollution within the constitutional authority of the Federal
government.”); Tyler Moore, Defining “Waters of the United States”: Canals, Ditches,
and Drains, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 37, 40 (2004) (“The Federal Water Pollution Control Act
of 1972 (FWPCA)—also referred as the Clean Water Act (CWA)—was Congress’[s]
attempt to comprehensively control water pollution of the nation’s waters.”); William L.
Andreen, The Evolution of Water Pollution Control in the United States—State, Local,
and Federal Efforts, 1789-1972: Part I, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 145, 157 (2003) (“The
growing blight of water pollution had, in short, offended the conscience of the nation, and
such a national problem demanded a national solution.”).
294
See cases cited infra notes 295-296.
295
See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
296
See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (“If Congress
shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the [agency] is directed
to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”).
298
See discussion supra Parts II.D-F.
299
Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2266 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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would award such a definition any more deference under Chevron than it
did in Rapanos. The remaining resolution for this problem is for
Congress to revisit the CWA and restate its intent with a clear
jurisdictional delegation. This section will address each option in turn.
A. Navigating the Rapanos Opinion: Should Marks Apply?
Supreme Court decisions are binding upon every lower court in the
United States.300 Therefore, lower courts must discern the holding of
every Supreme Court case carefully and precisely. When the Court’s
opinion splinters, the task can be very difficult. When no opinion
commands a majority of the Justices’ vote, as in Rapanos, which opinion
controls? If all circuits cannot answer this threshold question in a single
voice, future litigation on a case-by-case basis is not viable. In fact, as
discussed supra, the circuits have already split on this issue.301 I suggest,
however, that there is some value in examining the problems with
interpreting Rapanos in more detail.
The Supreme Court held in Marks v. United States that “[w]hen a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the
result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the
judgments on the narrowest grounds.’”302 In Rapanos, the plurality did
not command the assent of five Justices; Justice Kennedy, who
concurred in the plurality’s judgment, did not concur in the plurality’s
rationale.303 Therefore, the plurality opinion by logic cannot be
controlling. Justice Kennedy’s opinion, which commands the assent of
five Justices, should control the lower courts’ decisions.304
In a recent opinion, the Court observed that “[i]t does not seem
‘useful to pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when
300

Chowdhury v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 677 F.2d 317, 324 (3d Cir. 1982)
(“The essence of the common law doctrine of precedent or stare decisis is that the rule of
the case creates a binding legal precept. The doctrine is so central to Anglo-American
jurisprudence that it scarcely need be mentioned, let alone discussed at length. A judicial
precedent attaches a specific legal consequence to a detailed set of facts in an adjudged
case or judicial decision, which is then considered as furnishing the rule for the
determination of a subsequent case involving identical or similar material facts and
arising in the same court or a lower court in the judicial hierarchy.” (citing Allegheny
Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 969-70 (3d Cir. 1979))).
301
See discussion supra Part II.F.
302
430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15
(1976)).
303
Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2214, 2236 (4-1-4 decision).
304
A body of water judicially qualified as a “water of the United States” under Justice
Kennedy’s test for significant nexus would almost certainly satisfy the four dissenting
Justices as being such a water.
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it has so obviously baffled and divided the lower courts that have
considered it.’”305 The Grutter Court followed a splintered opinion with
no overlap in reasoning, like the one in Rapanos, without following
Marks to its “utmost logical possibility.”306 Instead, the Grutter Court
followed the rationale of one Justice’s opinion in concluding that student
body diversity is a compelling state interest.307 The Supreme Court
arguably has some latitude in following its own precedents. However,
what are the lower courts to do with an imprecise or ambiguous Supreme
Court decision? May they also take such liberties?
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens took a different approach
than in Marks or Grutter.308 Justice Stevens opined that the Sixth Circuit
should reinstate Rapanos’ judgment if either the plurality or the
concurrence’s tests are met.309 Justice Stevens assumed that, in most
cases, Justice Kennedy’s approach would control because it treats more
of the Nation’s waters as within the Corps’ jurisdiction.310 Justice
Stevens concluded that it was unlikely that a case will pass the plurality
test but not Justice Kennedy’s, so in effect Justice Kennedy’s test would
control.311 However, this unfair analysis forces the Corps to operate
under the plurality’s more restrictive test, which did not garner a majority
of the Justices’ votes.312
Because both the Marks and Justice Stevens’ calculus of
determining which, if any, of the Rapanos opinion controls are flawed,
an alternate method is needed.313 Simply put, any case that satisfies
Justice Kennedy’s test would garner at least five votes from the Rapanos
Justices, that is, those of Justice Kennedy and the four dissenting
Justices. Therefore, Justice Kennedy’s opinion should control in the
lower courts. However, Justice Kennedy’s “significant nexus” standard,
although arguably a more informed standard than the plurality or the
dissent, may be particularly unworkable. Courts would have the burden
of determining the level of “significance” of any nexus to the nation’s
waters. This is a task for which the federal courts are ill suited and which
is far better left to the scientific expertise of the EPA and the Army
305

Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) (quoting Nichols v. United States,
511 U.S. 738, 745-46 (1994)).
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Id.
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Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; see Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 31112 (1978) (“[Attainment of a diverse student body] clearly is a constitutionally
permissible goal for an institution of higher education.”)
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Rapanos, 126 S. Ct. at 2265 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Id.
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Id. at 2265 n.14.
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Id.
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Rapanos, 126 S. Ct 2208 (4-1-4 decision).
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Corps of Engineers, as Congress intended when it wisely delegated those
duties in the early 1970s.314
Regardless of whether the courts are the appropriate fora to decide
Corp jurisdiction under the CWA, the circuit courts already disagree
regarding whether Justice Kennedy’s opinion controls.315 This situation
was predictable; the Supreme Court itself appears unable to distinguish
which Rapanos opinion controls.316 Moreover, the inability of the circuit
courts to agree on which opinion controls exposes Rapanos’s failure as a
viable precedent. This complex split in the Supreme Court and its
resulting ineffectiveness as meaningful precedent leaves the courts with
little choice but to proceed through the fog without a compass.
B. Steaming Forward: Three Possible Futures of the CWA
After Rapanos, the courts, the Corps, and regulated individuals are
left with no clear idea of how to proceed under section 404 of the Clean
Water Act. If Congress fails to clarify the jurisdictional issue through
legislation, two approaches remain. The Corps could promulgate even
more rules than it already has, each one subject to scrutiny by the
Supreme Court. Alternatively, both Congress and the Corps could do
nothing and leave it to the courts to develop their own interpretations of
CWA jurisdiction over time, with case law differing wildly among the
circuits. The real solution is for Congress to eliminate the confusion they
created with the geographical jurisdictional limitation in 1972 by
revisiting the CWA and passing an amendment that definitively resolves
the Corps’ jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act.
1. Case-by-Case Adjudication: Standing Up in the Canoe
Litigation on a case-by-case basis is the most inefficient, unstable,
and often unfair method of resolving almost any legislative issue,
certainly one as complex and far-reaching as jurisdiction under the Clean
Water Act. Litigating the CWA on a case-by-case basis would force
courts to adjudicate cases presenting issues well beyond their scientific
expertise, and litigants would be at the mercy of a relatively uninformed
adjudicative body. Furthermore, case law provides the least guidance to
regulated parties, the EPA, and courts going forward. This situation is
particularly true in the case of Rapanos, where the circuits seem unable
to apply the decision consistently.317 Case-by-case litigation does nothing
314
315
316
317

See supra note 46.
See supra Part II.F.
See supra notes 309-12.
See supra Part II.F.
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to resolve confusion among the courts caused by the splintered Rapanos
decision and creates more confusion as the split circuits look to each
other for guidance. Moreover, ad hoc “regulation by litigation” is
profoundly expensive, unpredictable, and unfair to the administrators of
the CWA and regulated parties. Absent statutory certainty, courts need
guidance from a united Supreme Court. The Rapanos decision did not
produce such guidance; case-by-case litigation will only serve to
exacerbate the problem.
2. Agency Rulemaking: Anything More Than a Dagger Board?
A rulemaking by the EPA or the Corps is a more stable, lasting, and
informed method of regulatory clarification than quasi-rulemaking
through adjudication. However, an explicit reinterpretation by the EPA
or the Corps of its jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act is still subject
to review by the Supreme Court.318 In its current configuration, the High
Court does not seem inclined to grant deference under Chevron that the
executive branch requires, through the EPA or the Corps, to revise and
clarify the jurisdictional issue.319 The weakness, therefore, lies within the
language of the Clean Water Act itself.
3. Legislative Amendment: Refitting the Ship
Congressional revision of the Clean Water Act is the most stable
and workable solution. Revising the CWA would remove discretion from
its dual administration scheme and give weight to the CWA in the courts.
Revision from the legislative branch would provide the EPA, the Corps,
regulated parties, and federal courts with sorely needed and undeniable
guidance more effectively than agency rulemaking.
Congress passed the CWA over a presidential veto in 1972, and its
34-year history seems to indicate its permanent place in the nation’s
history.320 The Clean Water Act reportedly enjoys strong bipartisan
congressional support, both currently and historically.321 If such a
consensus exists, Congress may now be in a position to solve the CWA’s
jurisdictional incongruity by changing its statutory language. Statutory
revision may be the only way to ensure that the administrators can

318

See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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See Earthjustice.org, Wetlands Get Bipartisan Support from Senators,
http://www.earthjustice.org/news/press/004/wetlands_get_bipartisan_support_from_
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execute the CWA in a manner that is true to its stated intent of
comprehensive national pollution control.322
C. A Decent Proposal: The Commerce Clause as an Independent Basis
for Jurisdiction
Congress enacted the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972,
commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act (“CWA”), to protect the
nation and its economy from the unintended consequences of known
decline in water purity, physical waterways, and aquatic life.323 The
CWA’s stated objective is “to restore and maintain the chemical,
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”324 On its face,
the stated objective appears to have no connection whatsoever with the
geographic location of navigable waters.
As discussed above, Congress granted the Army Corps of
Engineers jurisdiction over the nation’s waters under the RHA to protect,
enhance, and develop navigable waters.325 It is understandable that
Congress would seek to expand the Corps’ jurisdiction to administer the
Clean Water Act, given the Corps’ expertise in the area of water
management. However, it was not necessary for Congress to perpetuate
in the Clean Water Act the doctrine of navigable servitude that anchored
the RHA. Congress could have instead linked the CWA to the health of
the nation’s waterways under its commerce power, as it did similarly
when enacting the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), without a
geographic jurisdictional limitation.326 In addition, Congress could have
authorized the EPA to create a new sub-agency to administer the CWA’s
permit program rather than delegate to the existing Corps of Engineers.
Congress did not do either of these alternatives. As enacted, the
CWA’s geographic link to “navigable waters” created confusion for the
courts, the administrators of the Act, and the regulated parties.327 What
constitutes a “navigable water” as contemplated by the Act? Where does
such a water begin? Where does it end? What is the status of a tributary?
How can the Corps effectively administer the CWA without some
control over intrastate activities that significantly affect the waters of the
322
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United States? Applying the existing doctrine of cumulative effects
aggregation as it applies to the Commerce Clause to create new
legislation could solve these questions and others.
1. Contours of the Modern Commerce Clause: From Lopez to Raich
In 1995, the Supreme Court set forth three categories of
commercial activity subject to regulation by Congress under its
commerce power in United States v. Lopez.328 These categories ensure a
sufficient nexus between the subject of the legislation and Congress’s
enumerated power to regulate commerce in order to maintain
constitutionality. These categories have been refined over time, and are
still in effect today.
The Lopez Court first held that “Congress may regulate the use of
the channels of interstate commerce.”329 Such channels include national
roadways, airplane routes, oceans, lakes, rivers, and other maritime
routes such as canals and locks. 330 They also include non-traditional
channels such as telecommunication conduits.331
Second, the Court held that “Congress is empowered to regulate
and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce.”332 The Court
noted that Congress may regulate such instrumentalities “even though
the threat may come only from intrastate activities.”333 Relevant
instrumentalities include local hotels and their employees,334 airplanes
and their passengers, aircraft and destruction thereof,335 interstate
shipments and theft thereof,336 and vehicles used in intrastate
commerce.337 This category could easily be extended to residential
developments, chartered fishing boats and their clients, passenger ships
and their riders, pleasure boats and their owners, and naturalists,
photographers, and hunters who cross state lines to engage in
commercial activity.
Finally, the Lopez Court held that “Congress’[s] commerce
authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that
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substantially affect interstate commerce.”338 Examples include “intrastate
coal mining[,] intrastate extortionate credit transactions, restaurants
utilizing substantial interstate supplies, inns and hotels catering to
interstate guests, and production and consumption of homegrown
wheat.”339 Other examples include intrastate on-site waste disposal340 and
building a state-of-the-art hospital in the habitat of a local fly protected
under the ESA.341
The Lopez Court stated that “[t]hese examples are by no means
exhaustive, but the pattern is clear. Where economic activity
substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that
activity will be sustained.”342 The Lopez Court thus held that Congress
did not have commerce clause authority to regulate possession of
firearms in a school zone because neither possessing a firearm nor being
in a school zone was economic in nature.343 Five years after Lopez, the
Court reaffirmed its position in United States v. Morrison, a case
addressing the constitutionality of federal legislation protecting women
from violence.344 The Morrison Court found that gender-based violence
was not an economic activity. The Court concluded, therefore, that
Congress had exceeded its commerce power in penning the Violence
Against Women Act.
The Lopez analysis survives today and Supreme Court decisions
subsequent to Lopez have continued to require a significant connection to
commerce to validate federal regulation under the Commerce Clause.
The Lopez “substantial effect on interstate commerce” test is fairly easy
to meet in many cases. Internet pornography regulation is valid under the
Lopez “channels of interstate commerce” test. Airplanes are regulated
under the Lopez “instrumentalities of interstate commerce” test.
Regulation of the sale of harmful drugs is valid under the Lopez
“substantial relation to interstate commerce” test. Regulation involving
objects that appear to have no commercial value, such as endangered
species and national waterways, present a trickier question.
The same year Morrison was handed down, the Fourth Circuit
upheld in Gibbs v. Babbitt, a federal regulation for the taking of red
wolves by farmers under the Commerce Clause.345 The Gibbs court
found that “[t]he taking of red wolves implicates a variety of commercial
338
339
340
341
342
343
344
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activities and is closely connected to several interstate markets.”346 The
Gibbs court also found that “[t]he relationship between red wolf takings
and interstate commerce is quite direct,” observing that the red wolf is
the subject of scientific research, wolf-related tourism, and trade in
pelts.347 The court further observed that “the individual takings may be
aggregated for the purpose of Commerce Clause analysis,” meaning that
“[w]hile the taking of one red wolf on private land may not be
‘substantial,’ the takings of red wolves in the aggregate have a sufficient
impact on interstate commerce” to support the regulation.348 This last
observation may be the most important element in saving the Clean
Water Act.
Three years after Gibbs, the Fifth Circuit upheld a federal
regulation in GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton under the
Commerce Clause for the taking by commercial real estate developers of
cave species protected under the Endangered Species Act.349 The GDF
Realty Court cited the Gibbs opinion favorably to support its decision.350
Also in 2003, the D.C. Circuit upheld a federal regulation in Rancho
Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton for the taking of the arroyo southwestern toad
under the Endangered Species Act.351 The Rancho Viejo court found that
the activity being regulated, namely construction of a commercial
housing development, was “plainly an economic enterprise.”352
Two years later, in Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court upheld a
federal regulation of personal cultivation of marijuana by private
individuals under the Controlled Substances Act.353 The Raich Court
found that the Controlled Substances Act was a valid exercise of
Congress’s Commerce Clause power because the regulated activity—the
manufacture, possession, and sale of potentially harmful drugs—
represented a huge interstate economic market. The Court also addressed
the issue of personal cultivation as it relates to cumulative effects
aggregation, which this comment will address infra.354
Legislation such as the Endangered Species Act and the Controlled
Substances Act are undisputedly rooted in Congress’s commerce power.
Although it is difficult to see how an endangered fly could be protected
under the Commerce Clause, the courts have consistently upheld the
346
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takings provisions of the ESA, often in combination of the doctrine of
cumulative effects aggregation to bring local activities within its reach. A
similar analysis could apply to federal regulation under the Clean Water
Act, were it not rooted geographically in the waters of the United States.
2. The Endangered Species Act: A Case Study in Independent
Commerce Clause Power
Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act under its commerce
power to protect the nation and its economy from the unintended
consequences of irrevocable loss in biodiversity.355 The ESA has no
geographic jurisdictional limit; a violation of the ESA may take place
anywhere in the United States.356 The Supreme Court has never
questioned the constitutionality of the ESA and other federal courts have
consistently supported the legislation.357 In GDF Realty v. Norton, for
example, the Fifth Circuit referred to an ESA Senate Report to support
the proposition that there existed a link between intrastate species
preservation and interstate commerce.358
One feature of the ESA requires courts to consider the safety of
endangered species above all other concerns, including cost to regulated
parties.359 In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, the Supreme Court
observed that “[t]he plain intent of Congress in enacting [the Endangered
Species Act] was to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction,
whatever the cost,”360 and that “the plain language of the Act, buttressed
by its legislative history, shows clearly that Congress viewed the value of
endangered species as ‘incalculable.’”361 Thus, the Tennessee Valley
Court refused to engage in weighing of the equities urged by the
Tennessee Valley Authority, observing that “even [if it] had the power to
engage in such a weighing process,” it would be difficult to “balance the
loss of a sum certain . . . against a congressionally declared ‘incalculable’
value.”362
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In enforcing the Endangered Species Act, the Tennessee Valley
Court declined to comment on the ESA’s constitutionality.363 The Court
instead restated the long-standing doctrine that it is not for the judicial
branch to inquire into the wisdom of Congress’s priorities.364 Instead, “it
is for the Executive to administer the laws and for the courts to “enforce
them when enforcement is sought.”365
Judicial deference to Congress plays an important part in the
possibility of amending the Clean Water Act. Congress could easily
repair the CWA by removing the geographic jurisdictional limit, as with
the Endangered Species Act; arguing that the Supreme Court would not
uphold the legislation would be difficult. All that would remain to
complete the scheme is addressing the seemingly insignificant acts that,
as a whole, had a significant affect on interstate commerce and navigable
waters. The doctrine of cumulative effects aggregation could bring the
CWA the rest of the way.
3. Cumulative Effects Aggregation: Wickard
In Wickard v. Filburn, the Supreme Court upheld federal regulation
of an individual farmer’s production and consumption of homegrown
wheat.366 The Court reasoned that the consumption of homegrown wheat,
even in small quantities, has an effect on the price and market for wheat
sold in interstate commerce. The Wickard Court announced a cumulative
effects aggregation theory as a framework to assess whether an activity
has a “substantial influence” on interstate commerce.367 The doctrine
holds that when Congress regulates a commercial activity that has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, such as selling marijuana, any
local instance of that activity is a violation of that regulation.368
In Maryland v. Wirtz, the Supreme Court observed that “the power
to regulate commerce, though broad indeed, has limits” and that the
Court has ample power to enforce those limits.369 The Wirtz Court stated
that “[n]either here nor in Wickard had the Court declared that Congress
363
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may use a relatively trivial impact on commerce as an excuse for broad
general regulation of state or private activities.”370 Rather, the Wirtz
Court observed that “[t]he Court has said only that where a general
regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de
minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of
no consequence.”371
Most recently, in Gonzales v. Raich, the Court upheld regulation of
personal cultivation of marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act.372
The Raich Court, following Wickard, reasoned that even a localized
instance of a regulated activity constitutes a violation of that
regulation.373 In an amendment to the Clean Water Act, it could mean
that Rapanos would be held liable for his local violation of a federal
regulation of commercial activity, namely, his commercial development
of private land.
In practical application, the doctrine of cumulative effects
aggregation can be stated to mean that where the general regulatory
statute (here, the CWA) bears a “substantial relation to commerce,”
individual instances of violation are actionable regardless of how large or
small the violation. Thus, were Congress to revise the Clean Water Act
to remove all reference to “navigable water” and authorize the EPA to
create a regulatory agency to administer the CWA, the debate over what
waters qualify as “navigable” would become irrelevant. The activity, i.e.
intrastate dumping or filling as it relates to the physical or chemical
quality of interstate water or its aquatic life, would be regulated, not the
waters themselves. Likewise, the activity of commercial land
development would also be regulated.
IV. CONCLUSION: CONGRESS SHOULD JETTISON THE “NAVIGABLE
WATERS” BALLAST
Congress typically roots its national environmental and pollution
legislation in its power to regulate commerce.374 In the case of the Clean
Water Act, however, Congress unwisely crafted the language of the
Clean Water Act in the shadow of the framework of navigational
servitude.375 Congress’s decision to write a geographic jurisdictional
limitation has undermined the stated purpose of the CWA, created
confusion in the judiciary as to the CWA’s jurisdiction, and unfairly
370
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forced scientific decisions into our nation’s courtrooms.376 Moreover,
Congress has been unfair to the regulated parties, costing them untold
sums in litigation and incalculable injury in the uncertainty of their
expected behavior under the CWA.
The EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers have been acting in as
broad a scope as possible since 1975.377 However, without adequate
support from Congress, these agencies experience problems with
enforcement, which results in confusion and expense for the agency and
more uncertainty for the regulated parties.378 Under Rapanos, courts may
attack Corps’ jurisdictional determinations with relative ease under either
the plurality or the concurring opinions, or a combination of the two.379
Therefore, agency rulings to clarify CWA jurisdiction would be
ineffective.
Clearly, responsibility for the nation’s water quality cannot be left
to the states. As discussed supra, “States and Tribes may assume
operation of the [CWA’s] section 404 program, and to date two have
done so (Michigan and New Jersey).”380 Congress enacted the Clean
Water Act because the States had refused to assume such responsibility.
The current instability created by the Rapanos Court’s insistence on
case-by-case analysis for CWA jurisdiction will certainly cause the
Clean Water Act to collapse as private owners and States’ rights
advocates gain momentum in the courts. Riverside Bayview and
SWANCC restrict the jurisdictional reach of the Clean Water Act and, if
Congress does not act now, the Clean Water Act will be significantly
weakened.
The Clean Water Act has not been substantially reworked since
1977.381 The judicial branch supports Congress’s ability to enact
environmental and pollution control legislation.382 In fact, no federal
environmental law has been found to exceed Congress’s authority to
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regulate activities that, even as taken in the aggregate, substantially affect
interstate commerce.383 If it is truly Congress’s intent that the EPA and
the Corps assert their jurisdiction expansively, Congress absolutely must
amend the statutory language to support that position.
Until and unless that happens, the EPA, the Corps, regulated
individuals, and the courts will struggle to define an unstable patchwork
of “substantial nexus” jurisdiction. Interested private parties will bring
suits in the federal courts to get the business-friendly decisions they
need. The courts will continue to weaken the Corps’ jurisdiction until the
Clean Water Act resembles more closely the River and Harbors Act of
1899 that it replaced. In the end, any scenario except an act of Congress
will create considerable litigation expense, inconsistency, and ultimate
failure to serve the stated federal pollution control objectives of the
Clean Water Act.
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